Designing matrix organizations that work: Lessons from the P&G case by Degen, Ronald Jean
ISSN 1984-3372 
 http//portaldeperiodicos.unisul.br 
ARTIGOS 
 
 
Designing matrix organizations that work: Lessons from the P&G case 
 
Projetando organizações matriciais que funcionam: Lições do caso P&G 
 
 
 
Ronald Jean Degen  
PhD Candidate at the International School of Management Paris and Vice Chairman of Masisa Chile. 
E-mail: degen@lomasnegras.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recebido em Set. 2008. Disponibilizado em 05 nov. 2009. 
Avaliado pelo Sistema double blind review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estratégia e Negócios, Florianópolis, v. 2, n. 1, jan./jun. 2009 
http://portaldeperiodicos.unisul.br/index.php/EeN/index 
 
  
©Copyright 2008 UNISUL-PPGA/Estratégia e Negócios. Todos os direitos reservados. Permitida citação parcial, desde 
que identificada a fonte. Proibida a reprodução total. Em caso de dúvidas, consulte o editor: 
terezinha.angeloni@unisul.br ; (48) 3229-1932.
Estratégia e Negócios, Florianópolis, v. 2, n. 1, jan./jun. 2009 
 ABSTRACT 
The matrix organization concept emerged from the US aerospace industry in the 1960s and was 
adopted by many companies in the early 1970s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s many companies 
were experiencing trouble with its operation and many argued like Peters & Waterman in their 
bestseller In search of excellence in 1982 (p. 306) that the matrix was too complex to work 
properly. Galbraith (2009, p. 10-14) explains that the reason for the problems were that the matrix 
in these organizations was wrongly adopted, hastily installed, and inappropriately implemented. 
He explains that adopting a matrix structure requires a collaborative organization form, proper 
power, and accountability distribution, complementing changes to the information systems, 
planning and budgeting process, the performance evaluation and bonus system, and so on. The 
purpose of this paper is to illustrate why companies adopted the matrix, what problems they had, 
the solutions for these problems based on Galbraith (2009) and other authors like Davis & 
Lawrence (1977), and the state of the art of matrix structure design today like the P&G front-back 
hybrid matrix organization. To illustrate the historical evolution of organization structure to the 
simple matrix and then to more complex matrix organizations we used the P&G case (Piskorski & 
Spadini 2007). 
Keywords: Matrix organization. Organization structure design. Front-back hybrid matrix 
organization. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Matrix organization is one of those management concepts, like Total Quality Management 
(TQM) or reengineering, that became very popular and then went through the management 
fashion cycle” writes Galbraith (2009, p.10). He continues explaining that the matrix became 
popular in the 1970s and early 1980s and was wrongly adopted, hastily installed and 
inappropriately implemented by many organizations. Therefore, word spread that the matrix does 
not work. In 1982, Peters and Waterman wrote the death sentence to the matrix: Our  favorite 
candidate  for  the wrong  kind  of  complex  response  is  the matrix  organization  structure (p.306). 
They explain that the matrix organization is very confusing, people do not know to whom they 
should report to, and virtually none of the excellent companies they surveyed informed that they 
had formal matrix with the exception of project management companies like Boeing. Galbraith 
(2009, p.9) says that this assertion is not true. Besides Boeing, Intel, Digital Equipment, Fluor, and 
Bechtel used a matrix. This did not change the overall perception and managers avoided matrix. It 
Estratégia e Negócios, Florianópolis, v. 2, n. 1, jan./jun. 2009 180
 was only in the late 1990s that the matrix concept became accepted again by managers due to the 
successful use by some companies. 
The prejudice against the matrix lingered on and in 2005, Bryan and Joyce wrote: …vertical 
oriented organizational structures, retrofitted with ad hoc and matrix overlays, nearly always make 
professional work more complex and  inefficient (p. 26). They go on saying that matrix structures, 
designed to accommodate the secondary management axes that cut across vertical silos, 
frequently burden professionals with two bosses so they have to go up the organization before 
they can go across it. Contrasting with this negative opinion on the matrix in the same year Neff 
wrote: None  did  a  better  job  overall  of  marketing  brands  in  2005  than  Procter  &  Gamble  Co 
(P&G)…In  the US  last year sales  rose 7%, more  than double  the pace of P&G’s categories. What 
really pushed the company to  its third consecutive year of double‐digit top‐line growth, through, 
were  developing markets, where  P&G  once  lagged major  rivals…  Analysts  say  the  clear  key  to 
P&G’s success has been the matrix organization put in place in the late 1990s under then CEO Durk 
Jager, even  if the pain of  implementing  it may have  led to his early exit … (2005, Abstract p. S2). 
Why is the matrix too complex and confusing to some and the reason of success to others like 
P&G? 
The P&G case (Piskorski & Spaldini, 2007) is ideally suited to answer this question and 
demonstrate the pitfalls and benefits of the matrix. Today the matrix is the preferred 
organizational concept used by most large multinational, multi-brand, consumer-products 
companies that have to perform well in at least three dimensions such as products, functions, and 
regions. By using the P&G history, we can trace a parallel by the evolution of its organization and 
the schools of thought in organization structure design and the matrix organizations in particular. 
Besides the change in leadership at P&G from Durk Jager to A. G. Lafley is an opportunity to 
analyze their strategies, leadership profile and the human resource, rewards, information and 
process policies required to manage such a complex multidimensional matrix organization.  
P&G  ORGANIZATION  EVOLVED  FROM  OWNER  ADMINISTERED  PRODUCTION  IN  1837  TO 
MULTIDIVISION STRUCTURE IN THE US IN 1954 AND IN EUROPE IN THE EARLY 1980s 
P&G is an American multinational company based in Cincinnati, Ohio, that manufactures 
wide range of consumer goods with net sales of USD 83 billion in 2008. 24 of its brands have more 
than a billion dollars in net annual sales, and another 20 have sales between USD 500 million and 
USD 1 billion (P&G Annual Report 2008). It is the 18th largest US company by profit (Fortune 500, 
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 2007), and the 10th most admired (Fortune Most Admired Companies 2007). The company was 
created in 1837 by William Procter, a candle maker, and James Gamble, a soap maker, who had 
settled in Cincinnati and married sisters, Olivia and Elisabeth Norris, whose father convinced his 
son-in-laws to become business partners (P&G Heritage Brochure 2009). 
EARLY HISTORY 
The P&G organization evolved from a simple informal owner administered production in 
1937 to a professional managed line and staff structure and after 1954 multidivisional organization 
in the US. Probably incorporating over the years ideas from the scientific management school 
initiated by Frederic Winslow Taylor (1911), administrative theorists like Henri Fayol (1949) and 
the bureaucratic school initiated by Max Weber (1946). These classic administrative theorists 
represented what can be called the mechanical school of organization theory because they treat 
the organization like a machine. They characterized organizations in terms of centralized authority, 
clear lines of command from top to bottom, division of labor, specialization and expertise, rules 
and regulations, and clear separation of staff from line functions. 
As individual ethic was giving way to social ethic in the early twentieth century, the human 
relations school started to emerge with Mary Parker Follet (1924) and Cherter Barnard (1938). This 
school that influenced management from mid twentieth century onward characterized 
organizations in terms of the need to harmonize and coordinate group efforts, emphasizing people 
rather than machines, accommodations rather than machine-like precision. The focus shifted to 
the motivation of the individual and group, delegation of authority, employee autonomy, trust and 
openness, upward communication and authority, and leaders who function as a cohesive and 
motivational force. 
The P&G historical timeline with the important business and organizational events from 
1937 to 1987 before the matrix organization was introduced in the US is shown in Figure 1. The 
transition from the classic line staff organization started in 1943 with the creation of the first 
category-product division in 1943, the drug-products department. Nevertheless, it was only in 
1954 that the US organization was organized into individual operating divisions to manage 
category-products with their own line and staff structures along two key dimensions: functions 
and brands. 
MULTIDIVISIONAL‐PRODUCT STRUCTURE 
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 Chandler (1962, p. 383-396) 
analyzing the history of a sizable sample 
of large US industrial enterprises 
concluded that their strategy determined 
their organization structures and that the 
common denominator between strategy 
and structure was the application of 
company resources to anticipated 
marked demand. He describes the four 
phases that can be discerned in the 
history of these large companies: the 
initial expansion and accumulation of 
resources; the rationalization of the use 
of resources; the expansion into new 
markets and product-lines to help assure 
the continuing full use of resources; and 
finally the development of a new 
structure to make possible continuing 
effective mobilization of resources to 
meet both changing short term market 
demands and long term market trend. He 
also points out that although each 
company had a distinct and unique 
history, nearly all followed along this 
general pattern.  The reason being that all 
of them operated within the same 
external environment and that the 
phases in the collective history of the 
industrial enterprise followed roughly the 
underlying changes in the over-all 
American economy. 
Figure 1 P&G Timeline from 1837 to 1987 Source: Piskorski & 
Spaldini 2007 
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 P&G was part of Chandler’s sample of companies (p. 6) and was with General Foods, 
General Mills, and Borden in the group that developed new products to use existing personnel and 
facilities more effectively and then to grow reorganized into multidivisional organization structures 
(p. 346). He explains that most US companies initially accumulated their resources in the years 
between the 1880s and First World War when P&G mass-marketed and mass-produced Ivory, and 
created the first centralized R&D department in the industry. During the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, these same firms build their initial administrative structures and P&G 
established its direct sales force, one of the first marked research departments, and 
institutionalized brand management. For some, continued expansion, largely through 
diversification, began in the 1920s but for most, it came after the depression of the 1930s. 
Although some pioneers of the new multidivisional structure to manage the expanded businesses 
began introduction in the 1920s, most enterprises like P&G carried out their reorganization in the 
1940s and 1950s (p. 386). It also clearly shows that the companies in developing over time the 
ideas for the new structure clearly borrowed from each other (p. 324). 
The survey conducted by Chandler showed that in the late 1950s the multidivisional 
structure was generally used by the largest US industrial companies. This organization a corporate 
office plans, coordinates and appraises the work of a number of operating divisions and allocates 
to them the necessary personnel, facilities, funds, and other resources. The divisions command 
most of the functions necessary for handling one major line of products or services over wide 
geographic area, and are responsible for their financial results and success in the market place (p. 
2). It is interesting to note that in the list of the largest US industrial companies of 1909 (p. 5) P&G 
does not appear and in the Fortune 500 1959 list of the largest industrial corporations is already 
48th. 
The rapid expansion and accumulation of resources of the large US industries from the 
1812 War to the Second World War can be explained by the large homogeneous American 
market, wars in Europe, and the protectionist US economic policies. Chan (2008, p. 50-51) explains 
that when the 1812 War broke out the US Congress immediately doubled import tariffs from the 
average of 12,5% to 25%. The war also made space for new industries in the US to emerge by 
interrupting the manufactured imports from Britain and the rest of Europe. The new industries 
that had arisen by substituting imports naturally wanted the protection to continue and in 1816 
tariffs were raised further to an average of 35%. By 1820, the average tariff rose further to 40% 
firmly establishing the program developed by Hamilton (1789) to protect what he called infant 
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 industries. This program guided US economic policy until the end of Second World War and 
explains the rapid sales growth and success of P&G’s Ivory soap, the first American soap 
comparable to fine European imports. 
It was only after Second World War with its industrial supremacy unchallenged that the US 
economic policy changed away from protectionism and started championing the cause of free 
trade to open foreign markets for these industries. P&G followed the trend set by other large US 
companies and established in 1948 its first international sales division. The international expansion 
led to the development of two different organizations: the multidivisional structure in 1954 for the 
US with its large and homogeneous market; and a decentralized hub-and-spoke line and staff 
structure in Western Europe due to its heterogeneous market. By the early 1980s, P&G was 
operating in 27 countries and a quarter of its revenues derived from overseas operations. 
PRODUCT‐CATEGORY DIVISIONS IN EUROPE 
To better appreciate the subsequent changes in the European organization we have to 
understand the series of initiatives toward regional integration started in Europe after the Second 
World War as an antidote to extreme nationalism that had caused so many devastating wars in 
the continent (European Union, 2009). Building on the success of the 1950 Coal and Steel Treaty, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands expanded cooperation to other 
economic sectors. In 1957, they signed the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic 
Community (EEC), or common market with the idea to allow people, goods, and services to move 
freely across borders. The custom duties on goods imported from each other were however only 
removed in 1968, allowing for the first time free cross-border trade between the six EEC countries. 
They also started applying the same duties on imports from outside countries. This created the 
world’s biggest trading group. In 1973, the six become nine when Denmark, Ireland, and United 
Kingdom formally joined the EEC. In 1981, Greece becomes the 10th member followed by Spain 
and Portugal in 1886.  
Although the custom barriers had been removed in 1968 trade did not flow freely across 
borders due to significant differences in national regulations. The Single European Act of 1986 
launched a vast six-year program to sort these differences out. The EEC officially became the 
European Union (EU) in 1992 when the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht. This 
treaty set clear rules for the future single currency as well as for foreign and security policy and 
closer cooperation in justice and home affairs. The Single Market and its four freedoms were 
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 established in 1993 - the free movement of goods, services, people, and money became a reality. 
In 1995, the Schengen Agreement was implemented for seven countries: Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. This agreement allows travelers of any 
nationality to travel between all these countries without any passport control at the frontiers. 
Other countries have since joined the passport-free Schengen area. Also in 1995 Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden joined the EU. The euro was established as the common currency to many EU 
countries in 2002. In 2004 the Czech Republic, Cyprus Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia joined the EU followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Rumania bringing 
the number of member states to 27. 
With all these integration moves, the European marked was gradually becoming more 
homogeneous and the P&G country functional structure was becoming cumbersome, expensive, 
and ineffective. Country manufacturing operations were not standardized, lacked economy of 
scale and so where costly and unreliable. Products were adapted to local norms and regulations 
that added little value to the customers but significant costs and complexity to the supply chain. 
For this reason, European management started early 1980s to promote cross-border cooperation 
across functions and to shift focus from country management to product-category management. 
This effort was successful in overcoming the objections of country manager’s arguing that the 
initiative would lead to the neglect of the local consumer preferences. 
The European organization in the early 1980s was first split into three sub-regions whose 
leaders were given secondary responsibilities for coordinating particular product-categories across 
the entire continent. This organization was subsequently fully restructured around continent-wide 
divisional product-categories with profit-and-loss responsibilities and country product-category 
general managers that reported directly to the divisional vice president who reported to the 
President for Europe. The concept of product-category divisions introduced successfully in Europe 
in the early 1980s was later incorporated into the US matrix structure in 1987. 
P&G ADOPTED THE MATRIX STRUCTURE IN THE US IN 1987 AND THE GLOBAL MATRIX IN 1995 
The introduction of the matrix organization in the US in 1987 was a direct consequence of 
the shift from the early functional organization into the multidivisional product organization in 
1954. The P&G started in its early years organized around activities and evolved barrowing from 
Taylors (1911) scientific management into a functional organization focused on mass-producing 
Ivory soap in the late 1880s and R&D in the 1890s to diversify into other chemistry-based 
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 consumer industries. Management was focused on economy of scale, specialization, and cost 
efficiency. 
In the 1920s with the direct sales force, management felt the need to better coordinate the 
products across the functions and brand managers were introduced followed by a market-
research department to understand customers and markets. This was the first shift away from the 
pure functional influence in the management decision process of the company to a light product 
influence. 
The need to effectively mobilize resources to meet growing and more complex market 
demands, as pointed out by Chandler (1962, p. 383-396), led to the multidivisional product 
structure in 1954, each with their how functions and brands, and some functional corporate 
coordination, particularly in R&D. Management decision process in the company was now firmly 
established with product influence and a light functional influence. This shift in influence in the 
management decision process is shown in Figure 2. 
In the P&G US multidivisional-product organization established in 1954 was mainly focused 
in matching company strategy with product category market dynamics. Brand managers in the 
same product division competed in the market place but shared strong divisional functions. The 
divisional functions transferred best practices and talent across many brands, fostering leading-
edge competencies in R&D, manufacturing, and market research in a rapidly developing 
consumer-product industry. Corporate R&D promoted innovative connections across divisions, 
one of these led to the invention of fluoride toothpaste in 1955. 
In 1987, the US organization reorganized into the product-category divisions introduced in 
Europe in the early 1980s. This was an historical shift away from the competitive brand-
management system put in place in 1931. Brands would now be managed as components of 39 
product-category portfolios by category divisional general managers, who also were responsible 
for the product-category functions. To strengthen functional influence, the matrix reporting 
structure was adopted and the divisional leaders reported directly to their divisional business 
leadership and had a dotted-line reporting relationship with their corporate functional leadership. 
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Figure 2 - Functional and product influence in decision making at P&G 
Source: Adapted from Galbraith & Nathanson 1978, p. 70 
At this point, it is important to understand why the P&G US organization structure in 1987 
adopted the matrix. The purpose was to balance better the product and the functional influence in 
the management decision process as illustrated in Figure 2. In the 1920s, the brand manager 
brought the product influence to bear in the decision process of the hierarchical functional 
organization structure and after 1954; it was the turn of corporate functional managers to bring 
the functional influence to bear on the hierarchical multidivisional-product structure.  
The matrix structure was the attempt to formally balance the two influences in the management 
decision process following the general trend in the industry. To better understand the matrix, the 
balance of the influence on the management decision process between two dimensions, and the 
problems and conflicts this generates we will give in a brief highlight how this organization 
structure came into being. 
EMERGENCE OF THE MATRIX 
The matrix organization that emerged in the late 1960s from the aerospace industry, has its 
origins in the scientific management era of the early 1900s according to Galbraith (2009, p. 7). He 
explains that it was Taylor (1911) who suggested the benefits of having multiple bosses that he 
labeled functional foremanship: a schedule boss, a quality boss, a tool boss, an administrative 
boss, and so on. The idea did not catch on because of the confusion of multiple bosses was to 
bring specialized skill directly to the workforce. 
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 Galbraith goes on explaining that the acceptable position was articulated by Fayol (1949) in 
the line-and-staff structure model. The hierarchy was the line organization with specialist roles, 
called staff roles, bringing expertise to bear without formal authority. The staff specialists would 
provide advice and service when requested by the line managers in the hierarchy. This structure 
model preserved the unity-of-command principle yet allowed expert advice to be used. 
According to Galbraith in the late 1960s, there simply were not enough resources for the 
US Government to fund the three big national programs: the space program with the man on the 
moon objective; the defense build up to support the Vietnam War; and the supersonic transport 
program. The result was that with scarce resources, cost and budgets became priorities. The 
change in strategic priorities from simply get the best technological performance to the additional 
objectives of cost and schedule resulted in changes in the aerospace companies organizations and 
they all adopted the matrix project management structure. The dual priorities meant that project 
managers responsible for costs and schedules and engineering managers responsible for 
technological development of the projects reported equally to the general managers. 
The success of the US space program in beating the objective set by John Kennedy to put a 
man on moon by 1970 made the press pick up the matrix as the hot new management trend and 
books on the subject began to appear. One of the best books introducing the matrix organization 
in the late 1970s was Davis & Lawrence’s Matrix (1977). The two authors reproduce in the book (p. 
2) a text that appeared in the GE’s Organization Planning Bulleting of September 1976 that states: 
We have highlighted matrix organization… not because  it  is a bandwagon that we 
want you all  to  jump on, but  rather  that  it  is a complex, difficult, and sometimes‐
frustrating,  form  of  organization  to  live with.  It  is also, however, a bellwether of 
things to come. Hovever, when implemented well, it does offer much of the best of 
both worlds. And all of us are going to have to  learn how to utilize organization to 
prepare managers to increasingly deal with high levels of complexity and ambiguity 
in situations where they have to get results from people and components not under 
their direct control… Successful experience  in operating under a matrix constitutes 
better preparation  for  individual  to  run a huge diversified  institution  like General 
Electric – where so many complex, conflicting interests must be balanced – than the 
product and functional modes which have been our hallmark over the past twenty 
years. 
This extract from the GE bulleting explains very well the complexity of implementing the 
matrix structure and the need to abandon all precepts of the mechanical school of organization 
and the need to embrace the modern practices of the human relations school. 
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 Originally, organization structures were functional following the mechanical school with 
the purpose of optimizing resource allocation, of work specialization and cost reduction. The 
strategy was to compete in the market by efficiency in producing products or delivering services. 
As the business world became more complex organization structures evolved in response to this 
complexity and started creating coordination mechanisms to manage additional dimensions like 
products, geography, and customers. Some of these coordinating mechanisms were brand-
product managers and functional teams as shown in Figure 2. 
The need to be efficient in at least two dimensions let to the development of the matrix 
structure where the functional side is responsible for efficient resource allocation and the market 
side is responsible for the efficient response to client needs. The dual-strategy is now focused on 
functional and on market efficiency to obtain organization effectiveness. The relative weight given 
to each strategy varies between companies and can be inclined toward functions, markets or 
balanced as shown in Figure 3. The relative weight between the two dimensions is generally 
represented in the organization charts by the solid-line for the main hierarchical reporting line and 
dotted line for the lateral or secondary reporting line. 
The conflicts in the matrix are commonly caused by the pursuit of the optimization of the 
overall strategy of the company that in many cases requires the sub-optimization of one or both of 
its dimensions. This need to eventually sub-optimize the dimensions in benefit of the whole is 
contrary to the mechanical organization school where success is measured by individuals work 
efficiency. Individuals in many cases do not understand or resist the idea of sacrificing their work 
efficiency in favor of another if the reward system and human resource policies do not take the 
need of sub-optimization in favor of the overall objective into account. 
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Figure 3 - Matrix organizations – functional and market dominant and balanced structures 
Galbraith (2009, p. 10-19) explains that the matrix organization is a collaborative 
organization. People must develop collaborative skills to share power in the organization. These 
are the skills that the modern human relations school promotes, like the harmonization and 
coordination of group efforts in organizations replacing the individual hero of the past. But to 
make this possible companies must ensure that their information and reward systems and human 
resource policies are aligned with the matrix organization structure and the overall strategy of the 
company and don’t create biased behaviors distorting the cooperative behavior. 
There are according to Davis & Lawrence 
(1977, p. 46-52) three key roles in the matrix: the 
top leadership, the matrix leaders that must share 
subordinates with other matrix leaders and the 
subordinates with two bosses. These roles are 
shown in Figure 4 with the matrix leaders divided 
into functional leaders and market leaders. What 
makes these leadership positions different from 
other leadership positions is the behavior required 
for them to effective in the matrix structure. 
 
Figure 4 Matrix leadership 
Source: adapted from Davis& Lawrence 1977, 
p. 47-50 
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 The top leadership has to be outside the matrix overseeing its operating performance and 
solving eventual conflicts. With their behavior, they have to incorporate the need to collaborate, 
sell this need to the subordinates, coach, and oversee their functioning, and ensure the adequate 
balance of power between the two dimensions. To avoid biases the strategy has to be set above 
the matrix structure and the balance of power of the dimensions by the top leadership and then 
implemented top down to the lower levels of the organization. 
According to Davis & Lawrence (1977, p. 48) one of the several paradoxes of the matrix it is 
requirement of a strong unity of command at the top to ensure balance of power at the next level 
down. This balancing of power of the top leadership requires a unique blend of autocratic and 
participative leadership. The top role will have to firmly and decisively arbitrate disputes that 
cannot be resolved along the dual lines, at the same time promote collaborative decision making 
and ensure that both lines have approximately equal influence in the decision making process so 
as to guarantee the proper balance between the dimensions. 
The matrix leaders are definitively in the matrix and share their subordinates with other 
matrix leaders. These leaders report in direct line to the top leadership but do not have a 
complete line of command to their subordinates. They have an unequal distribution of authority 
and responsibility. They share authority with equals over the same subordinates to get their work 
done and are responsible to the top leadership for the performance of a function or a market 
dimension in the organization. This requires of them special leadership abilities to make things 
happen. They need to get results by the strength of their knowledge, abilities, arguments, and 
personalities rather than by their position in the hierarchy. 
The subordinate with two bosses has to learn how to accommodate simultaneous and 
sometimes competing demands. This role is not different than that of the matrix and top leaders. 
All must pay heed to competing demands, evaluate alternatives, make trade-offs, try to convince 
others of their arguments, and manage conflicts that cannot be resolved. In this organization 
structure, the power to influence results derives directly from the person’s acceptance by the 
team due to the quality and strength of its arguments and personality. Career success in a matrix 
derives more from getting things done by facilitating decisions than from making them. In this 
organization structure, there is no room for the egocentric individuals. The structure to be 
effective needs people that know how to work in teams, cooperate with each other, and take 
satisfaction from the team’s success. 
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PROBLEMS WITH THE MATRIX 
The P&G historical timeline 
from the introduction of the matrix 
organization in 1987 to the 
announcement of the reorganization 
plan named Organization 2005 in 
1998 is shown in Figure 5. After 
adopting the matrix in 1987 with 39 
US product-category business units in 
the later 1980s, the matrix was 
expanded to include Europe. Country 
functions were consolidated into 
continental functions with doted-line 
reporting to the newly created global 
corporate functional leadership and 
direct reporting to regional product-
category business managers. 
In 1989, global corporate 
product-category presidents reporting 
directly to the CEO were created to 
better coordinate product-categories 
and branding worldwide. The country 
product-category business general managers had dotted-line reporting to these global corporate 
product-category presidents located in Cincinnati and line reporting to the regional product-
category business vice presidents who were responsible for their career progression and 
promotion. The product-category presidents were also given direct responsibility for global R&D in 
their product-category, who in turn had a dotted-line responsibility to global corporate R&D. 
Figure 5 -  P&G Timeline from 1987 to 1998 
Source: Piskorski & Spaldini 2007 
The reason for P&G to slowly migrate to the global matrix organization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s was the success of the cross-border cooperation across functions in Europe, that 
set an example for the rest of the world, and the attractive expansion opportunities in Japan and 
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 developing countries in the late 1980s and the need to respond to the new challenge of appealing 
to more diverse consumer tastes and income levels. In 1995 the structure was extended to the 
rest of the world through the creation of four regions – North America, Latin America, Europe 
(including Middle East and Africa), and Asia – each which a president reporting directly to the CEO 
and responsibility for profit and loss. 
The P&G global matrix three dimensional organization chart is shown in Figure 6. The full-
line reporting represents the profit and loss responsibility and the dotted line reporting represents 
the cross regional coordination or influence on the decision making process by the product 
category presidents and functional senior vice presidents. 
The matrix organization structure facilitated top- and bottom-line improvements. 
Particularly, the creation of global functions permitted pooling of knowledge, transfer of best 
practices, elimination of redundancies, and standardization of activities. The creation of one 
product-supply function to manage the global supply chain allowed the consolidation of 
manufacturing facilities and distribution centers. At the same time, the global sales organization 
was transformed into the Customer Business Development function to develop global 
relationships with big customers like Wal-Mart. Global category management also generated 
benefits like by standardizing and accelerating global product launches. 
The strong global and regional functions that had promoted extraordinary benefits 
appeared to create a strong imbalance in the matrix structure in detriment of the country product-
category managers. The matrix structure was never intended to be balanced and was designed to 
be product-category dominant or market dominant as shown in Figure 3. This was a shift to the 
middle from the multidivisional-product organization of 1954 as shown in Figure 2. The intended 
dominant influence on the decision process of the regional product-category was clearly defined 
by the solid line reporting and their profit and loss responsibility as shown in Figure 6. The 
functional and the global product-category influence were intended to be secondary as 
demonstrates the dotted line reporting. 
The reason for the reversal in the imbalance of the matrix from country-product-category 
managers in favor of the functional leadership seems to have been caused by the high degree of 
de-facto control they had on the country functional managers because they determined their 
career paths and promotions, and those of their subordinates. The functional managers trying to 
optimize their particular parameters in cases sub-optimized regional performance conflicted with 
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 the regional managers that were the sole responsible for the financial results. A similar conflict 
arose between the product-category global leadership and the country managers who were 
reluctant to implement initiatives that affect their short-term results even if this meant sacrificing 
future gains for the company. These unresolved conflicts made it difficult to make the regional 
profit centers fully accountable for their results. 
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Figure 6 - P&G Global matrix structure with three dimensions – regional (1), functional (2), and product-
categories (3) 
Source: adapted from Piskorski & Spaldini 2007 
The organizations inability to solve the classic conflicts between the functional overall cost 
optimization strategy, with the regional managers focused on local profit-and-loss, and the 
product-category leaders initiatives that increased short term cost to capture future profits raised 
serious doubts about the matrix structure and if it was the right organization for P&G. It became 
clear that each dimension was trying to optimize its parameters and that neither sought tradeoffs 
that would optimize the overall performance of the company. To make things worst competitors 
were catching up quickly in the market and sales growth was down to only 1.4 percent in 1987 
from an average yearly growth of 8.5 percent in the 1980s. The problems with the matrix and the 
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 poor sales performance prompted P&G to announce in 1998 a six-year restructuring plan named 
Organization 2005. 
MATRIX PATHOLOGIES 
The pathologies of the matrix structure developed by P&G between 1987 and 1995 were 
probably properly diagnosed and corrected in the new Organization 2005. It is important to 
understand these errors to appreciate the new and successful matrix structure that is in place 
today. The same mistakes were made by many organizations in the 1970s and early 1980s and led 
to the discredit of the matrix as explained in the introduction. 
The first and most obvious problem is the need to abandon the mechanical school 
approach to managing an organization and create a culture of teams and collaboration. This is 
especially difficult for managers trained in business schools that stress individual class competition 
in business cases discussions instead of building consensus around a common goal. They have to 
abandon the idea of winning vis-à-vis others. The matrix operates in a balance of power model. 
The matrix leaders must understand that if they win the power struggle with other leaders 
absolutely the organization as a whole loses performance ultimately. They must understand that 
total victory in one of the dimensions only destroys the balance and the matrix. There are some 
examples of this type of pathology in the P&G matrix (Piskorski & Spaldini 2007, p. 7-8). 
Top leadership must understand that a power struggle will always develop between the 
dimensions. What they have to ensure that the matrix leaders are worthy adversaries and that 
they understand the need to turn the conflict to constructive common end. For this to work the 
top leadership has to manage three important things: prevent that one side totally wins or loses, 
ensure that the matrix leaders always maintain an institutional point of view, and remove those 
that through inability are constantly losing and replace them with stronger managers. 
Galbraith (2009, p. 10) stresses the need that the matrix organization form has to be 
implemented using a collaborative change process. He goes on saying that people should develop 
the collaborative skills they will need in their roles in the matrix structure during its 
implementation phase. The managers that were not properly prepared and simply ordered to 
collaborate usually faked it because they did not understand what it meant. Many ordered to 
share power did not and passively resist the matrix. When the expected benefits of power sharing 
were not achieved, these resistors were quit to suggest that the matrix structure did not work. For 
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 this reason, many poorly managed change processes resulted in failure, even when the matrix 
structure was the best solution for the business. 
The second problem was the high number of management layers and the imbalance in the 
design of the matrix structure. The matrix to function properly must have the proper balance and 
coordination between the matrix leaders so that the subordinates can properly negotiate, 
accommodate, and optimize the conflicting demands as shown in Figure 4. The design of the P&G 
global matrix structure shown in Figure 6 clearly had serious design flaws accentuated by the 
many management layers that generated imbalance and conflicts between the three dimensions: 
global functions, regional product-categories, and global product-categories. 
Applying to the Davis & Lawrence 
key roles to the P&G global matrix we can 
clearly identify the structural design flaws 
that created some of the operational 
problems that hindered its proper 
functioning. These design flaws are shown 
in Figure 7. The top leader had simply too 
many subordinates to be able to properly 
coordinate the performance and solve 
conflicts with the matrix leaders at the 
region and country levels far down the 
organization. 
The poor subordinated product-
category-country general managers that 
were supposed to accommodate the 
competing demands were in a skewed 
position. They had a strong input from the 
regional-product-category vice presidents to whom they were accountable for profit and loss. The 
input from product-category president was weak because it came from far up in the organization 
hierarchy and bypassed their direct boss. The functional input bypassed them and went directly to 
their country functional managers. The regional vice presidents that were supposed to coordinate 
conflicts between country general managers and regional functional directors were skewed 
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Figure 7 - P&G skewed matrix leadership 
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 toward their regional president to whom they had profit and loss responsibility and did not 
balance properly the influence between region and country with the functions. The consequence 
of this distorted situation was that the country managers gave priority to financial results over 
product-category initiative and had a constant conflict with their functional managers. 
The third problem was that the required complementary and reinforcing changes to the 
culture, the information and accountability system, the budgeting and planning process, and the 
performance, career and bonus system necessary to successfully implement the matrix structure 
had not been made. By keeping the processes and systems of the previous multidivisional 
organization structure P&G maintained the strong regional and functional silos that where co-
responsible for its problems with the matrix structure. 
The functional managers gave much more attention to the influence in the decision 
process to their functional leaders to whom they theoretically had only a dotted-line report in 
detriment to their regional and country leaders to whom they had full line reporting, This 
imbalance in the decision process was the consequence that the functional leaders determined 
their career paths and promotions of all the functional personal. The regional and country 
managers in their turn were responsible for profit and loss and complained about their lack of 
cooperation to reach their objectives of their functional subordinates that were set on following 
functional agendas. They were in their turn reluctant to implement product-category initiatives 
that affected their short-term financial results and consequently bonuses. 
The main problems that P&G matrix structure had – the lack of a proper collaborative 
culture, the excessive management levels, and profit centers, the skewed design of the structure, 
and the disaggregating effect of its processes and systems – motivated its management to 
restructuring program named Organization 2005. 
So not to be unfair with P&G management that originally implemented the matrix in 1987 
it is important to note that these problems were common to most early matrix structures 
implemented following the management fashion in the 1970s and early 1980s and motivated 
many of them to abandon it and spread that “the matrix doesn’t work”. This believe was widely 
accepted at the time, according to Galbraith (2009, p. 10), to the point that managers avoided the 
matrix, even in situation where it was appropriate. He continues explaining that because the 
matrix structures worked in some companies and benefit in certain situations the matrix concept 
was reinstated in the late 1990s and assumed its normal place in organization design theory. 
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 P&G RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM 
The objective of the restructuring program P&G announced in 1998 was to achieve $900 
million in annual after-tax cost savings by 2004 by voluntary separation of 15 thousand employees, 
of with 10.5 overseas, and eliminating six management layers, reducing the total from 13 to 7, at a 
cost of &1.9 billion over five years. The plan also called for the dismantling of the global matrix 
structure introduced in 1995 and replacing it with an amalgam of independent organizations: 
Global Business Units with primary responsibility for products, Marked Development 
Organizations with primary responsibility for markets, and a Global Business Services unit 
responsible for managing internal business processes. 
This new organization structure is now known as the front-back hybrid matrix according to 
Galbraith (2009, p. 115-127). This structure has two parallel multifunctional line organizations: one 
focused on the customer-markets designated the front end, and a second focused on products 
designated the back end. The objective is to achieve simultaneously the customer focus and 
responsiveness and the global-scale economies. To effectively achieve these conflicting objectives 
the management challenge is to effectively link and balance the customer-market front end with 
the product back end in a matrix. The corporate functions form an additional matrix across the 
two parallel organizations. 
THE RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM 
The implementation of the ambitious restructuring program started with the installation of 
Durk Jager as the new CEO by the P&G board January 1st of 1999 in substitution of John E. Pepper 
who had been Chairman and CEO from 1995 to 1998. Pepper who managed the company during 
the years that the matrix got into trouble and the planning of the restructuring program with 
Jager, the COO, stayed on as Chairman up to 2002. He announced his departure from P&G were 
started working in 1963 in the 1999 annual report (p. 10-11) but stayed on to 2002 because of the 
implementation problems of the restructuring program, the sudden departure of Jager, and his 
substitution by Alan G. Leffley as CEO in June 2000. When he left the company, Lefley became 
Chairman and CEO. The PG historical timeline from the announcement of the restructuring 
program in 1998, the success of the new matrix organization in 2005, and the continuing success 
up to 2007 is shown in Figure 8. 
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 Jager in the P&G 1999 Annual Report (p. 3-5) explained his vision: The  first key  to  faster 
growth, greater business vitality,  is  increasing the pace of  innovation at P&G. This has been true 
for us  in  the past and  is  just as  true  today. …Our  Innovation  Leadership Team, which  I  chair,  is 
fueling  our  growth  in  new  product  categories.  It  funds  promising  ideas  that  fall  outside  our 
businesses, from seed‐level investment all the way through test market. Previously, these kinds of 
ideas  would  often  go  undeveloped.  … 
Today, we have  tapped only a portion of 
our  innovation  capacity.  With 
Organization  2005,  we  are  making 
changes  to  unleash  this  capability  and 
capitalize  on  the  new  marketplace  in 
which  we  compete.  …  New  Global 
Business Units  (GBUs)  leverage our scale. 
We  will  develop  products  and  plans 
globally,  to  better  utilize  our  technology 
and  get  products  to  the  world  faster. 
Focus  on  new  business  will  increase  our 
innovative  output.  Each  GBU  has  a 
dedicated  New  Business  Development 
unit  to  create  new  brands  in  related 
categories. 
The vision Jager had is typical of 
an entrepreneurial manager. These 
managers according to Degen (2009, p. 
359-366) are excellent in producing the 
needed change in companies that 
became bogged down in an 
administrative stalemate like apparently 
P&G was. He explains that these 
managers have the vision and the 
courage to make the necessary changes. 
Hiwever, they never stop to implement 
Figure 8 - P&G Timeline from 1998 to today 
Source: Piskorski & Spaldini 2007 and P&G annual reports 
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 these changes and tend to continue making changes. They tend to have no patience for the detail 
required to execute the new strategy that they created. When this happens, they have to be 
substituted by administrative managers that are god implementers of changes. These managers 
are good executers but not entrepreneurial enough to make them. This seems to have been the 
case of P&G, where Jager made the entrepreneurial changes, created high expectation of 
immediate unrealistic results for such an ambitious restructuring program, and was substituted by 
Alan G. Lafley an excellent administrator and executer. 
To better understand the personalities of Jager and Lafley and the context we reproduce 
some quotes from the press at the time. Before Jager became the CEO McLean wrote: Is P&G all 
washed up? (1997, p. 184). He cites an analyst that pointed out that the sales per share of P&G, 
Clorox, Colgate-Palmolive, and Kimberley-Clark that since the second quarter of 1993 have slipped 
more than 20 percent. What has driven the earnings gains are a number of onetime factors like 
sharply falling interest costs, slow growth in depreciation expenses, and lower effective tax rates. 
A year after Jager took over Brooker wrote: “You have to create a revolution,” he (Jager) declares 
coming  into  the  job. Facing  six consecutive quarters of  stagnant  sales,  Jager vowed  to  snap  the 
163‐year‐old $38 billion behemoth out of its stupor. He would whip bastions of stogy Proctoids into 
a sleek fighting force of nimble, entrepreneurial freethinkers and bigger risk takers. “Everybody  is 
always worried about taking risks, because nobody likes to fail,” he avowed at the time. “But you 
have to celebrate failure.” For a company with a long history of playing it safe, this promised to be 
a real imbroglio. One year later Jager’s revolution is in full swing. The company has overhauled its 
reporting lines. It started up an internet beauty site in San Francisco. It bought a multibillion‐dollar 
business,  launched  three new big product  lines, and will  introduce another  five  this year. All  this 
from a place  that has not delivered a blockbuster product  since  the  introduction of Pampers  in 
1961. A new P&G, for sure,  is emerging. However, the question  is,  is  it  improving? … Jager’s one‐
year report card is in. … Jager’s aggressive plans have hit earnings hard. This quarter, net income is 
down 1%. By contrast, a year ago it grew 11%. … the year 2000 will determine whether Jager is the 
Mr. Clean  that P&G  so desperately needs (2000, p. 44-45). In June of 2000, Jager resigned and 
Lafley took over. 
Little more than two years after Lafley took over as CEO, Brooker & Schlosser wrote: 
Lafley’s predecessor, Jager, had been brought in – like Lafley – for a rescue mission. … Jager had an 
aggressive  plan:  Launch  a  slew  of  new  products  in  hopes  of  finding  the  next  big  billion‐dollar 
product,  like Tide or Pampers. Trouble was, he did not  find  it. … At  the same  time,  Jagers other 
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 ambitious  initiatives backfired. … As each 
initiative failed, the troops at P&G began 
to  feel  rudderless.  …  When  he  came  in, 
Lafley had  to move  fast. … As he  saw  it, 
P&G  did  not  need  a  radical  makeover. 
What  it  needed  was,  well,  to  sell  more 
Tide.  In  its  rush  for  new  products,  P&G 
had  neglected  its  older  brands  like  Tide 
and  Pampers.  However,  those  billion‐
dollar blockbusters are, and have always 
been,  the  company’s  bread  and  butter.  … 
brands. …  If the plan was shocking  in anyth
command could understand it: Selling more 
Tide. … As he got P&G’s mighty brands on 
Jager costs had gotten out of control, … To 
eliminating some 9,600 jobs. He shut down s
sold  off  …  units,  which  were  not  strategic
company, with 1002,000 employees  in 80 co
transformation. Some credit Lafley’s calm, u
iota of bluster. Lafley credits the employees.
Watching A. G. Lafley at work is a deceptivel
that  the  55‐year‐old  New  Hampshire  nativ
managed to pull off what neither his two 
predecessors  could  –  turn  around  the 
global behemoth.  In addition, did this  in 
the midst of a world economic slowdown 
(2002, p. 88). 
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The implementation of the 
complex restructuring program required 
clear execution skills to manage the cost 
reduction objective, the radical change 
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Figure 9 - Lafley’s turnaround in net earnings Therefore,  Lafley  refocused  the  company  on  its  big 
ing,  it was  its simplicity. Everyone down the chain of 
Tide is less complicated than trying to invent the new 
track,  Lafley also had  to get expenses  in  line. Under 
cut expenses Lafley began a massive round of  layoffs 
kunk works projects and pulled flopped launches… He 
  fits.  …  For  a  traditional  dowry  grande  dame  of  a 
untries, there was surprisingly  little resistance to the 
nflappable focus, a directness that comes without an 
 … he says. “In crisis, people accept change faster.” … 
y unimpressive sight. As far as CEOs go, it is fair to say 
e  does  not  have  much  dazzle  or  flair. ….  Lafley  has 
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Figure 10  - 10-year total shareholders return 
Source: P&G Annual Report 2008 
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 separation of 15 thousand employees, the reduction from 13 to 7 management levels, the 
redesign of the internal processes and systems to the new structure and so on. Such a massive 
restructuring program normally creates all sorts of problems as middle management first resist 
and then adapts to the new structure. For this reason, results in the first years tend to suffer and 
the benefits only start appearing after some time as show for the P&G case in Figure 9 and 10. 
Jager, the entrepreneur, launched the restructuring program, was over optimistic, overpromised, 
and created the crisis. Lafley, the administrator, calmed the crisis, did not overpromise, focused 
the organization, and implemented the needed changes. The resulting new P&G organization, the 
front-back hybrid matrix structure is today an example of a successful organization design. 
THE P&G FRONT‐BACK HYBRID MATRIX ORGANIZATION 
The key attribute of the matrix structure is the balance of power between the different 
dimensions of the company. One of the most direct ways to enhance the power of a dimension is 
to make it report higher up in the hierarchy. The business units in the P&G organization 
established in 1995, the product-category country units, reported to regional managers, who then 
reported to the CEO. In the new Organization 2005 two types of interdependent organization 
were created both reporting directly to the CEO, the customer focused or front-end organization 
called Market Development Organizations (MDOs), and the product-categories focused or back 
end business units called Global Business Units (GBUs). In order to give support to these two 
organizations the Global Business Services (GBS) organization was created focused on reducing 
costs. The basic corporate functions were kept centralized. Both the GBS and the corporate 
functions reported directly to the CEO. 
The MDOs were led by a president who reported directly to the CEO were responsible and 
compensated for sales growth. Their mission was to focus on customer needs and adapt the 
company’s global marketing and sales strategies and programs to these local needs. Each of the 
seven MBOs – North America, Western Europe, Central Europe (including Middle East and Africa), 
Latin America, Northeast Asia, China, and Asia (including Australia and India) – had its own 
consumer market research, sales, in-store presence, and other support functions. 
The GBUs operated autonomously each led by a president that reported directly to the CEO 
and was responsible for profit and loss of a product-category. Each of the seven GBUs – fabric and 
home care, healthcare, beauty care, snacks and beverages, tissue and towels, feminine protection, 
and baby care – had its own marketing, market research, R&D, manufacturing, purchasing, 
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 distribution and other support functions. The GBUs also managed their own new business 
development functions. To ensure that the GBUs shared technological innovations with each 
other, a technology council was created where all were represented. 
The GBS led by a vice president that reported directly to the CEO and was responsible for 
standardizing, consolidating, streamlining, and ultimately strengthening business processes and IT 
platforms across GBUs and MDOs. GBS was organized into a cost center with three “follow-the-
sun” service centers – Costa Rica, England, and the Philippines – to perform business-process work 
24 hours a day. 
This new structure solved four problems of the old structure: first it created a clear balance 
between these two key dimensions – customer focus and product focus; second it presented a 
unified sales contact for customers that is focused on sales growth of all products; third the 
product-category business units with profit and loss responsibility have full control over their key 
functions; and fourth the service functions and corporate functions formed a third and fourth 
dimensions in matrix structures over the two key dimensions. The structure of Organization 2005 
is a four-dimension front-back hybrid matrix with a top leader, a coordination council to define 
priorities and solve disputes, matrix leaders, and subordinates with the need to coordinate and 
balance four influences structure as shown in Figure11. 
The routines and policies that had created problems to the proper functioning of the 
matrix organization also streamlined and adapted to the new structure. A single business-planning 
process was created whereby all budget elements could be reviewed and approved jointly by the 
various matrix leaders. The incentive system was also overhauled and adapted to the new 
organization, maintaining the promote-from-within policy. The performance-based portion of the 
compensation for upper-level executives increased from 20 percent to 80 percent, with 40 percent 
up or down of base pay. Stock-option compensation was extended from previously less than then 
thousand employees to over hundred thousand. 
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Figure 11 - P&G Organization 2005 is a four-dimensional front-back hybrid matrix 
Source: Piskorski & Spaldini 2007  
 
ESIGNING MATRIX STRUCTURES THAT WORK 
The success of the P&G clearly demonstrated by the growth of earnings in Figure 9 and the 
rowth in net sales in Figure 12 was 
xplained by Lafley: We have  clear 
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Figure 12 - Lafley’s turnaround in net sales ten consistently about these factors for several years now. I 
e  I remain confident these three factors will enable P&G to 
 even more productively, and to deliver consistent sales and 
 for the next five years (P&G Annual Report 2006, p. 2).  The 
trix organization structure to the P&G success as stated by 
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 Lafley can be explained by the star model framework developed by Galbraith (2002, p. 9-16) 
shown in Figure 13. 
Using his star model framework for 
organization design Galbraith explains that 
there are five categories of interlocked 
organization design policies that are 
controllable by management in a company and 
influence employee behavior. The first is 
strategy, which determines the direction of the 
company. The second is structure, which 
determines the location and influence of the 
decision-making power. The third is 
processes, which determine the flow of 
information in the organization. The fourth is rewards, which influence the motivation of the 
employees’ to perform and address organizational goals. The fifth are the people or human 
resource policies, which influence and frequently shape the employees’ mind-set and skills. 
Figure 13 - Galbraith’s star model 
Source: Galbraith 2002, p. 15 
The pathologies of the early P&G matrix structure highlights the need to align all the five 
categories and not only strategy and structure. Strategy required that P&G to be excellent 
simultaneously at two different dimensions of the company – customers and products. The front-
back hybrid matrix structure gave the company the ability meet these two challenges with the 
MDOs and the GBUs and at the same time build strong and efficient lateral processes with the 
GSO and the corporate functions as shown in Figure 11. Only aligning strategy and structure was 
not enough to guarantee success. The reward and the process design policies had also to be well 
aligned and balanced between the competing dimensions. Nevertheless, key to the proper 
functioning of the matrix structure are the people. Matrix is a collaborative organization form and 
people have to have the necessary collaborative skills to function properly. 
 
LEADERSHIP IN A MATRIX ORGANIZATION 
Another key component of a successful matrix organization is a competent and 
collaborative leader at the top of the matrix. The top of the matrix is where the two, three, or four 
dimensions, as in the P&G case, come together. It is at this points that natural tensions between 
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 conflicting objectives come together and need to be resolved so that the overall objective of the 
organization prevails skewed dimension objectives. When these natural objectives are effectively 
and expediently resolved by collaboration between top and the matrix leaders, the matrix 
organization works well and is successful in all its dimensions. When the conflicts are not resolved, 
the organization suffers and in some cases becomes dysfunctional and paralyzed, as did the P&G 
organization before Organization 95 was introduced by Jager in 1999. 
The top leader does not have to have the final word on all conflicts explains Galbraith 
(2009, p. 202). He must see that all conflicts are effectively resolved. To achieve this he must 
create a collaborative team culture, design the appropriate lateral teams to solve conflicts, and 
provide the team participants with the training and infrastructure to support their decision 
making. He must also give the example on how the consensus-driven conflict resolution process 
works. 
One of the several paradoxes of the matrix, write Davis & Lawrence (1977, p.48), is that the 
matrix requires a strong unity of command at the top to ensure the proper balance of power down 
the organization and a same time strong subordinates participation in the decision process. This 
calls for a blend of autocratic and participative leadership styles. 
This seems to have been exactly Lafley’s style according to Brooker & Schlosser (2002, p. 
88):  It is late afternoon, and a dozen of P&G top staffers have been huddled in a small conference 
room… Another  clutch  of  executives  begins  arguing…  There  is  one  person  (Lafley)  in  the  room, 
however, who has not said much of anything. …he is seated off to one side, hunched over a white 
legal pad,  scribing notes. He  looks  like a  college professor –  fresh  scrubbed, a bit nerdy. …in a 
fleeting moment of quiet, he  looks up and clears his  throat.  I do not want  to bog us down,” he 
begins with a hint of apology… He does not finish the pitch but rather prods the others to continue 
the thought… an outside director… adds that it helped that the chief executive is also a tough nut. 
“He knows how to  lay down the rules when he needs to”… This is the ideal leadership style for a 
complex matrix organization like the P&G matrix. It is the blend of low-key participative style with 
a strong autocratic leadership when needed. 
The leadership style of Lafley contrasts crassly with the style of Jager as described by 
Brooker (1999, p. 146-152): He’s  (Jager)  build  like  a  linebacker  and  talks  like  Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. “If  it  isn’t broke, break  it,” he  likes to say. …Jager will tell you himself the nasty 
things people say about him: “I break kneecaps. I make heads roll.” Once, in a meeting, an insider 
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 recalls, when a colleague droned for too long, Jager snapped: “What kind of shit are you trying to 
clutter my mind with here?” People call him all kinds of things behind his back, perhaps the most 
polite being “Crazy Man Durk.” … “He is like General Patton arriving with the Third Army,” says… a 
managing director … instead of an opposing army, what is under attack here is P&G itself. Jager is 
here  to  deliver  Procter &  gamble  a  serious  kick  in  the  pants. As explained before, this style is 
adequate to make changes but completely unsuited to manage the implementation of these 
changes and more so to manage a matrix organization where the right blend of autocratic and 
participative leadership styles is needed. 
CONCLUSION FROM THE P&G CASE 
Business organizations have evolved since the start of the industrial revolution as “one 
boss” unitary command structures modeled according to what can be called the mechanical 
school of organization theory. This school characterized organizations in terms of centralized 
authority, clear lines of command from top to bottom, division of labor, and so on. The military 
and the church are all institutions that believe in maintaining pyramid-like structures whose main 
feature is the unity of command. For them the authority of those higher in the hierarchy is a given. 
The multiple-boss model of the matrix was made possible by the general adoption of the human 
relations school in the 1970s and 1980s. This school characterized organizations in terms of the 
need to harmonize and coordinate group efforts. The focus shifted away from authority and unity 
of command to the motivation of the individual and group, delegation of authority, employee 
autonomy, and so on. The matrix organization to work properly needs managers than can move 
away from the absolute boss culture of the mechanical school to the collaborative team culture of 
the human behavior school. 
The main drive for P&G to choose the matrix structure was the need to pursue a multiple-
priority strategy – customers and market focus, product focus and functional efficiency – besides 
the sharing of expensive resources. The matrix pathologies developed during the 1980s and early 
1990s. The first and most obvious problem was the need to abandon the mechanical school 
approach to managing an organization and create a culture of team and collaboration. The 
absolute boss behavior of the COO and later CEO Jager boosting: I break kneecaps. I make heads 
roll (Brooker 1999, p. 146-152) is absolutely contrary to what is needed to make a matrix 
organization work properly. The second and third problems was the high number of management 
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 layers and the imbalance in the design of the matrix structure, and that the required changes in 
the processes and systems necessary to implement the matrix structure had not been made. 
These problems were common to most early matrix structures implemented following the 
management fashion in the 1970s and early 1980s and motivated many of them to abandon it. 
Authors like Peters & Waterman (1982, p. 306) argued against the use of the matrix based of these 
unsatisfactory experiences. 
The sophisticated front-back hybrid matrix structure designed and implemented under 
Jager would have failed if Lafley with is autocratic and participative stile and above all his grasp of 
the many details needed to make it work had not taken over in the right moment. This is again a 
demonstration that the CEO defines the strategy and culture of an organization. If he gets it right, 
the organization succeeds like P&G did. 
PROJETANDO ORGANIZAÇÕES MATRICIAIS QUE FUNCIONAM: LIÇÕES DO CASO P&G 
RESUMO 
O conceito de organização matricial emergiu da indústria aeroespacial nos anos 1960 e foi 
adotado por muitas empresas no início dos anos 1970. No final dos anos 1970 e início dos anos 
1980, muitas companhias tiveram problemas com esta forma de organização e muitas 
argumentara, como Peters e Waterman no sue bestseller In search of excellence em 1982 (p. 306) 
que a matriz era muito complexa para funcionar adequadamente. Galbraith (2009, p. 10-14) 
explica que a razão para os problemas era que a matriz nestas organizações era adotada 
erradamente, instalada apressadamente e implementada inapropriadamente. Ele explica que a 
adoção estrutura matricial requer uma organização de forma colaborativa, poder apropriado e 
distribuição de responsabilidades, complementando mudanças nos sistemas de informação, 
planejamento e orçamentação, no sistema de avaliação de desempenho e bônus e, assim por 
diante. O propósito deste artigo é ilustrar porque empresas adotaram a matriz, que probleas 
tiveram e as soluções para estes problemas com base em Galbraith (2009) e outros autores como 
Davis & Lawrence (1977), e o estado da arte em projeto de estrutura matricial atual, como a P&G 
front-back hybrid matrix organization. Para ilustrar a evolução histórica da estrutura 
organizacional para a matriz simples e depois para matriz mais complexa utilizou-se o caso P&G 
(Piskorski & Spadini 2007). 
Palavras‐chave: Organização matricial. Projeto de estrutura organizacional. Front-back hybrid 
matrix organization. 
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